tired fools

i studied chinese foreign policy. i enjoyed that they often made policy moves out of left-field. there was the incident that saw chinese sailors moon overboard at russian cadres on the beach; the invitation to the US ping-pong team that brought about nixon’s visit in 1972, the “pre-emptive counter-attack” in korea. The actuality of the latter is well described here:

They came out of the hills near Unsan, North Korea, blowing bugles in the dying light of day on 1 November 1950, throwing grenades and firing their “burp” guns at the surprised American soldiers of the 8th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division. Those who survived the initial assaults reported how shaken the spectacle of massed Chinese infantry had left them. Thousands of Chinese had attacked from the north, northwest, and west against scattered U.S. and South Korean (Republic of Korea or ROK) units moving deep into North Korea. The Chinese seemed to come out of nowhere as they swarmed around the flanks and over the defensive positions of the surprised United Nations (UN) troops. Within hours the ROK 15th Regiment on the 8th Cavalry’s right flank collapsed, while the 1st and 2d Battalions of the 8th Cavalry fell back in disarray into the city of Unsan. By morning, with their positions being overrun and their guns falling silent, the men of the 8th Cavalry tried to withdraw, but a Chinese roadblock to their rear forced them to abandon their artillery, and the men took to the hills in small groups. Only a few scattered survivors made it back to tell their story. The remaining battalion of the 8th Cavalry, the 3d, was hit early in the morning of 2 November with the same “human wave” assaults of bugle-blowing Chinese. In the confusion, one company-size Chinese element was mistaken for South Koreans and allowed to pass a critical bridge near the battalion command post (CP). Once over the bridge, the enemy commander blew his bugle, and the Chinese, throwing satchel charges and grenades, overran the CP.

yes, massive numbers of chinese swamping the US troops unexpectedly. for twenty years i’ve been wondering when we’d see this again.

i was taught a number of things about the motivation of chinese policy. i have no idea, now, how accurate these are. it depends on your view on the relative merits of ideology and pragmatism. (btw ideology, here, is nothing to do with communism, more to do with chinese nationhood.) i don’t know so much of the modern chinese hierarchy. i think i lost it after deng. but up until him, i would say that china wouldn’t hold back given such an obvious opportunity as they have now. they’re holding the west to ransom and they know it. but what will they do? i’m pretty certain that, whatever it is, it won’t be obvious.